Wednesday, December 29, 2004
The Rules of Arithmetic
There's a must-read post at Daily Kos that examines the casualty rate of American forces in Iraq, and what the rate means to our war effort. Diarist Stirling Newberry writes that when you examine the numbers from the Battle of Fallujah, in which we took out three insurgents for each American soldier lost, it looks good at first. But when you compare it historically to similar battles against insurgency, well, not so much.
At the current rate of attrition, Newberry sees a crisis point about 18 months from now, when we simply will not have enough skilled troops on the ground to compete with the insurgency. And Iraqi security forces, a key cog in the administration's plans to pacify the country, aren't going to be much help.
If the situation gets worse in Iraq during 2005--and given what we've seen throughout 2004, how could it not?--I'd be willing to bet Newberry's 18-month deadline gets moved up. And that means the United States is going to have a serious choice to make, likely before the end of 2005:
1. Wish the Iraqi government elected on January 30th good luck and get the hell out, bringing on the civil war sensible observers have been predicting all along.
2. Continue the present course with the present force, which chews up what Newberry calls "the elite warrior pool," the cutting edge of American military power, making it less effective in the war it's already fighting, and with with grave consequences if trouble breaks out elsewhere in the world.
3. Continue the present course while taking measures to build up the American forces. Since no other country is going to offer us anything more than their best wishes, that means a draft of Americans.
Given Bush and Rumsfeld's dogged insistence that no mistakes have been made in Iraq and that the status quo is just fine, Numbers 2 and 3 would have to be the early betting favorites. And when the inexorable power of arithmetic becomes undeniable even within the faith-based community running this war, Number 3 will come to pass. But if Newberry's arithmetic is correct, we'll be drafting people into a military force that's less able to properly train and lead them, decreasing the likelihood that we'll be able to achieve something that looks like victory while increasing the likelihood that the draftees will be killed or wounded.
Happy New Year, indeed.
There's a must-read post at Daily Kos that examines the casualty rate of American forces in Iraq, and what the rate means to our war effort. Diarist Stirling Newberry writes that when you examine the numbers from the Battle of Fallujah, in which we took out three insurgents for each American soldier lost, it looks good at first. But when you compare it historically to similar battles against insurgency, well, not so much.
[T]hat number is well below the historical victory rate for occupiers or established military forces against an insurgency. The grey zone is around 4 or 5 to 1. If an established force is only disabling at 4 to 1 against an insurgency, it is very likely to be headed for defeat, not victory. To give an idea of scale, the US coalition inflicted 1000:1 during the first Gulf War, and 100:1 during the invasion. In the most intense days of fighting [in Fallujah], the ratio dropped to 2:1. In short, a rate which is headed for defeat.And it's not just gross casualty rates for all personnel involved that tell the story--it's who's getting taken out.
In Vietnam it was not, ultimately, the attrition of enlisted personnel that was fatal to the US war effort, it was the attrition of low level officers. While the casualty rates for "grunts" in Vietnam were high, they were more sustainable than the Korean conflict, or the American Civil War. What was unsustainable was the attrition to the officer core - which was at rate comparable to the worst conflicts in American history. There was a leadership drain. This is a continuing pattern: in Afghanistan, it was the loss of high level officers and helicopter pilots that doomed the Soviet occupation.When you lose those officers, as well as fighters with special skills such as pilots, you lose leadership and training capacity. Because this is not easily replaced, sacrificing such personnel is like eating your seed corn.
At the current rate of attrition, Newberry sees a crisis point about 18 months from now, when we simply will not have enough skilled troops on the ground to compete with the insurgency. And Iraqi security forces, a key cog in the administration's plans to pacify the country, aren't going to be much help.
[I]t is clear that the Iraqi security forces are completely ineffective against the insurgents, the insurgents are killing or disabling more security forces, than in reverse, and are able to execute strategic attacks on infrastructure as well. Taking out the insurgents killed by the coalition, the insurgents are outkilling the government by at least 3:1. . . .And even with our help--the chopper forces, tanks, training facilities, and so on--they're getting their butts kicked.
The Iraqi military isn't even a modern mechanized force. It is, essentially, a World War I level force taking on a similarly equipped insurgency. It does not have mobile hospitals, control of hard points. It does not have chopper forces, tanks, high level command and control, training facilities, or safe places to rotate forces.
In short, the Iraqi security forces are fighting on a roughly equal footing with the insurgents.
If the situation gets worse in Iraq during 2005--and given what we've seen throughout 2004, how could it not?--I'd be willing to bet Newberry's 18-month deadline gets moved up. And that means the United States is going to have a serious choice to make, likely before the end of 2005:
1. Wish the Iraqi government elected on January 30th good luck and get the hell out, bringing on the civil war sensible observers have been predicting all along.
2. Continue the present course with the present force, which chews up what Newberry calls "the elite warrior pool," the cutting edge of American military power, making it less effective in the war it's already fighting, and with with grave consequences if trouble breaks out elsewhere in the world.
3. Continue the present course while taking measures to build up the American forces. Since no other country is going to offer us anything more than their best wishes, that means a draft of Americans.
Given Bush and Rumsfeld's dogged insistence that no mistakes have been made in Iraq and that the status quo is just fine, Numbers 2 and 3 would have to be the early betting favorites. And when the inexorable power of arithmetic becomes undeniable even within the faith-based community running this war, Number 3 will come to pass. But if Newberry's arithmetic is correct, we'll be drafting people into a military force that's less able to properly train and lead them, decreasing the likelihood that we'll be able to achieve something that looks like victory while increasing the likelihood that the draftees will be killed or wounded.
Happy New Year, indeed.
